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BODIES OF LITERATURE,
BODIES OF LAW
By SIMON FODDEN**

Those That Tremble As If They Were Mad
In a recent novel by Fay Weldon - Letters to Alice: on first
reading Jane Austen1 - she explains literature to her niece, a
freshman in college, by an extended metaphor in which writers are
builders of the City of Invention. I thought of lawyers, as I often
do, and how it used to be said in more sanguine times that lawyers
are social engineers. 2 Builders and engineers. Siblings, surely. But
what a difference and how different are their cities.
I live with a foot in each city? It might be more accurate
to say that I live here and drive to work there, daily commuting
sentences. I feel a great difference between these cities - the City
of Invention and the City of ... what shall we call it? the City of

Copyright, 1987, Simon Fodden.
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This paper was originally
presented in a slightly different form to the Graduate Seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School in
November, 1985.
1 London: Michael Joseph, 1984.
2Although this view was current perhaps twenty or so years ago, it is at least as old as
Roscoe Pound's, hIterpretationsofLegal History,which was published in 1923. See the reprinted
edition: (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967) at 152: "Let us think of jurisprudence for a
moment as a science of social engineering...."
3Te world is so wide and I am so unlike a colossus that it can be a painful stance.
Moreover, Coke's description comes to mind of "the law's grave study," and gives me at times
at least one cold foot.
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Convention, perhaps - and at the same time have a sneaking sense
that they are the same place, or at least twin cities, the Minneapolis
and St. Paul of some state.
Weldon sites her city on the road between Heaven and Hell.
Some prospects! It is harder to say where the City of Convention
would be found, but it probably would exist where, after all, most
people convene; and that, I think, might be more modestly described
as somewhere on the road out of Hell. And not so far out of it, for
I find that we denizens of the City of Convention have a tendency
to stand around in nervous groups and gaze with fascination at the
old country. Our walls and our windows are generally built to face
in that direction. Our work, when we are not building these
structures, tends to consist of sending raiding parties back rather
more often than it does of sending exploring parties ahead. Can it
be that we know that, while there might be literature, there will be
no law in heaven?4
Perhaps I ought not to have teased out of the city-on-a-road
metaphor the possibility of travel, or at least, migration; for whether
law or literature can "improve" with time is a difficult question. For
me, to the extent that the road is called Science or New Knowledge,
neither of these cities can be moved but can only at best engage in
urban sprawl. Rather, it seems that Weldon's metaphor is intended
to suggest a static scheme of relationships. I think of those medieval
paintings of fortified cities atop middle-ground mountains: on the
roads which wind from the front to the distant back of the picture
there are a few travellers - pilgrims, perhaps - who venture between
redoubts; but the cities are forever as fixed as the mountains upon
which they are constructed.
This becomes clear when we understand from her location of
the City of Invention that Weldon sees it as a salient of civilization:
she says as much, before she begins her metaphor: "Would you

4
If the state is to wither away at some point short of the last trump, then it seems to
follow that law will disappear even before that lightening for the generalized apotheosis.
Indeed, Grant Gilmore leaves us in no doubt:

In Heaven there will be no law....
In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process
will be meticulously observed.

The Ages ofAmerican Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) at 111.
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prefer me to say," she asks Alice, "more safely, 'Literature stands at
the gates of civilization, holding back greed, rage, murder, and
savagery of all kinds?', 5 Well, lawyers, as they used to say, can
relate to that.6 Indeed, it seems rather to be turf belonging to the
city I have twinned to the city she creates. An exaggerated claim by
her? Surely. A foolish claim? A stolen claim?
It is, at least, a claim which places literature and civilization
in the most intimate of relationships in her schema. Where does law
stand in this not-quite-yet-round world? She nowhere mentions law
within her city or around it, which is understandable; it is, after all,
hers and she is a writer. But I find it unnerving how infrequently
law figures in the lists of any of those who extoll those civilizing
institutions of our society. Literature is invariably on the list, and
law is beyond the pale; and this must be a difference between law
and literature. But what does it mean?
It is worth keeping an eye open for this phenomenon, and
if I am right about the law's lowly estimation by culture-minded
listmakers, it is worth asking why that should be so. The good
Northrop Frye does not entirely neglect law. In The Educated
bnagination7 he invents a whole culture on a desert island, step by
step to civilization; but it takes him until his recapitulation to
remember law: it lies in the second of three levels of language, that
of "practical sense," spoken by engineers, doctors, farmers, architects,
teachers, preachers, politicians, advertisers ...
and, oh, lawyers. "Then
there's the level of imagination, which produces the literary language
of poems and plays and novels."8 We lawyers exist because Frye
was, after all, a clergyman; and lawyers are lapsed theologians, as
someone once said. But we are firmly in our place, outside the

5See supra, note 1 at 10.
6

Consider the discussion of the "bulwark" metaphor for law in M. Ball, Lying Down
Together: Law, Metaphor, and Theolog (Madison, Wi.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) at
24 and ff.
7 Toronto: CBC Publications, 1963.
8

Ibid. at 6.
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gates, preparing the way for those who would become "really
9
human."
Again, a literary critic can be forgiven. But what about the
lawyer-president, John Adams (he of the "a government of laws and
not of men" fame, of which more below)? Here is his list of ranked
desiderata:
I must study politics and war that my sons may have the liberty to study mathematics
and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography,
natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order
to give their children ajght to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary,
tapestry and porcelain.

Where would he have put the study of law if someone had reminded
him of it? Prior to the study of war, presumably.
Although not a lister by nature, Thomas More, too, is the
creator of an imagined and glorious, ideal civilization.
In his
2
Utopia,1 he describes a land "of only a few laws."'
Since they [the Utopians] are such a well-educated society, few laws are required....
They exclude from their country absolutely all lawyers since these plead cases with
cunning and slyly dispute the laff....
The truth prevails, they feel, when the case is
not confused by lawyers' tricks.

91bid. at S.
10

John Adams, "Letter to Abigail Adams, May 12, 1780," in C. Adams, ed., Letters of John
Adams, addressed to his wife, vol. 2 (Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1841). Notice that
"sons" turns to "children" when it comes to porcelain etc. He says elsewhere that: "The law ...
will not bend to the uncertain ...
imaginations ...
of men.": "Adams' Argument for the Defence

[December, 3-4 1770]," in L.K. Wroth & H.B. Zobel, eds, Legal Papersof John Adans, vol. 3,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965) at 269-70. We have seen already that according to
Frye the law and imagination, even an "educated" one (or perhaps especially an educated one),
do not belong in the same category.
i use the translation by J.Green & J.Dolan, eds, Utopia and Other Essential Writings
of ThomasMore (New York: NewAmerican Library, 1984). Weldon, I discover upon re-reading
Letters while re-writing this essay, also refers to More and his Utopia. More than once. See
Weldon, supra, note 1 at 18, 86.
12 See Green & Dolan, supra, note 11 at 50.
13
Ibid. at 79-80. This passage occurs in Book Two, the actual description of Utopia. The
same passage makes clear that "[i]n Utopia, however, all excel in legal knowledge." But it
makes equally clear that this is a simple knowledge, not lending itself to "a subtle interpretation
[which] would go beyond the masses." No university law schools, then, in Utopia.
For a discussion (and lampooning) of his contemporaries at the bar, see generally
Book One of Utopia.
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It might be noted that the discussion of law in Utopia comes under
the general heading of Slavery, which heading follows those of The
Cities, The Magistrates, Crafts and Professions, Social and Business

Relations, Travel (under which the Utopians' "zealous" absorbtion of
the newly introduced Greek literature is recounted with approval),
and which precedes the headings of Military Affairs and Religions.
Of course, this ranking - and my concern with it as such -

is the sort of thing that people in the City of Convention talk about
on an evening when the cable is on the blink. But just so that my
left foot knows what my right foot is doing, let me offer you this
comment on listing itself from across the river in the City of
Invention from a writer named Borges:
Theseambiguities, redundancies, and deficiencies recall those attributed by Dr. Franz
Kuhn 1 to a certain Chinese encyclopedia entitled CelestialEmporium of Benevolent
Knowledge. On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into (a)
those that belong to the emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (e) those that are trained, (d)
suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are
included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j)
innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's-hair brush, (1) others, (m)
those th% have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a
distance.

How hard is it to see the meat of this as s.21 of some statute?

Draft s.22 when you have time.
This Essay Is Not
a linear assault on a topic. Unlike legal writing, this essay
(which means a try, after all) will circle around and allude when it
suits me. It is one way of doing things, a way more common in the
City of Invention, I believe. However, anyone who has tried to
write anything knows this skittish, prey-predator attitude to expressed
language. I suspect that in both the cities just discussed, the squares

14Surely no relative to the much-cited Thomas Kuhn of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions fame (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). It used to be (and may still
be) nearly obligatory in an article on law and language to refer to this work. See, for example,
the symposium on law and language: (1982) 60 Texas L Rev. at 373 - 586, in which four of the
eight authors refer to his book. And there ... I too have done it.
15Jorge Luis Borges, "Dr. Jekyll and Edward Hyde, Transformed", trans. K. Stolley, in E.
IL Monegal and A. Reid eds, Borges: A Reader (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981) at 142.
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are full of circling men and women, some moving clockwise, perhaps,
because time is money, and some widdershins;16 and in this state the
direction matters less than the bent.
It is also the method of conversation properly practised - not
the overlapping lapping at each other with "my turn" words. With
a friend it meanders as a river meanders while the water in it seeks
its own level. And that is an important point. Not just that
converso is to turn around, but that conversari is to keep company
with. In the City of Convention we must and do come together; and
when people do that, they talk: company is taken into the parlour.
So this is natural (worrisome word - perhaps human, then) and
pleasurable. No bad thing.
Yet law ...
is come to the point. (How many is one
allowed?) Relevance is all. But to what can it be relevant (which
used to mean to relieve, to ease, to comfort)?
Law and literature. Literature and law. Why bother
circling? The distinction must be evident to some, if not to the
majority; the communalities trivial. The one is serious. Important
stuff of life as she is lived. The other is a mental game involved
with myths that may or may not be harmful.
Adams and Eve
How curious that we should ever have created the dichotomy
that permits a distinction between a government of laws and a
government of men. How curious, given the dichotomy, that we
should genuinely prefer a government of laws to one of people.
God is in part to blame, and more of them below. But we
have swallowed the camel (God knows) with some strain, and think
this way now. Weldon reports a common response of non-writers
to a novelist: "They think if only they had the time, they'd do it
themselves. They say, such a life I've had! I really ought to put it
all down some day; turn it into a book!,1 7 But when confronted with

16

Which means counter-clock-wise, from the German wider sinn ("against sense"), and is,

curiously enough, retained in the Scots version of English. Sense, of course, moves to the right.
17

See Weldon, supra, note 1 at 15.
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injustice what do people say? "There ought to be a law!" That's
what they say. As if a novel is something that could emerge from
them but a law comes from elsewhere, elsewhom. As if laws could
exist: fiat lex. Which is the City of Invention now?
Perhaps the "men" (as in "government of men") is emblematic
of the difficulty.
I am privileged to teach family law, a curious subject for a
law school. It is not only that money often or usually plays a clearly
secondary role in the disputes I examine. It is the nearly
oxymoronic nature of the name of my subject that impresses me:
think of law, and today one thinks of the individual, of abstraction,
rules, rigour, reason; think of families, and one thinks of relation,
emotion, sex, love, caring (and not caring), and rigor only in relation
to a corresponding softness. Once upon a time (my time, I suspect),
students were wont to divide courses into "hard" and "soft" courses;
they may still use this language. But whatever the words, the clear
fact is that family "law" is a soft subject.
This dichotomy is present, again, insofar as law and literature
are concerned. Frye finds a similar mapping applied commonly to
the sciences on the one hand and the humanities on the other, and
in this context the law is to be seen as a social science. Here it is
made explicit that this dichotomy is one based on the stereotypical
distinctions between male and female:
This symbology ... says that the sciences ... are rugged, aggressive, out in the world
doing things, and so symbolically male, whereas the literatures are narcissistic,
intuitive, fanciful, staying at home and making the home more bwutiful but not doing
anything really serious, and are therefore symbolically female.

This 'whole business of "symbology," to use Frye's term, is difficult,
yet it seems to me that at one level, at least, law is commonly
regarded as male by us today. Not a novel insight, as anyone who
has read Carol Gilligan 19 could say.
For me, a number of things emerge from this polarity. The
first and most obvious is that if it is "true" in a deep sense that law
18

N. Frye, Spirltus Mund Essays on Literature,Mythj and Society (Toronto: Fitzhenry and

Whiteside, 1976) at 102.
19I am thinking particularly of her In A Different Voice: PsychologicalTheory and Women's
Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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is currently masculine, and I think that it is so true, then we are
missing. I mean nothing so simple as the fact that there are
numerically more men than women in law, and that "we" will be
reconstituted when the proper quotas are filled; for I do not map
masculinity onto all and only men and femininity onto all and only
women. The me that is a "we"would be devastated thereby; I could
not properly convene.
And clearly in the City of Invention
masculinity and femininity are resources in which we all may share,
however literature may be regarded from the outside and by contrast
with sciences; for, at the most basic level, we have all read fiction
written by men in which women are created, and by women in which
men come to life.
The second thing is that for me it is in some sense not true
that law is masculine in the way that I have just captured that idea.
(Poetry need not be the only place where, as Howard Nemerov puts
it, "contradictions do not destroy one another."2 ) I come at this
dichotomy from the very practical job of teaching law. I observe the
essential role that feelings and the undeniable uniqueness of each
person - better, each relationship - play in the struggle to resolve
a family law dispute. I read judges who write about the difficulty
of decision in language that is so filled with emotional distress that
it bursts past the ratiocinating patterns. I see students become
angry, embarrassed, fearful, sad. Law students. And I feel that this,
of course, is very like life. Which sets me to wondering where life
goes in the law in "hard" areas.
I do not believe that the fullness of life (male and female)
is simply absent in the law in these areas. For that to be so, I
would have to conceive of the law as a coating, a scum, that floats
always the same centimetre thick on top of the variegated shapes
that (the other thing) human life assumes; such that where tax
problems present themselves to the law for example (and by contrast
to family problems) life has already been drained away by some
mysterious and non-legal process so that there is no life for the law
to work with, to become. This technical view of the law, this view
that sees it waiting in an office for the problem to appear as a detus
ex machina, is an unsatisfying view. This is the view that says if you

20Figures of Thought (Boston: David R. Godine, 1978) at 10.
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opened a window in the blank side of a building in the City of
Convention, nothing would be there. (In the lawyer's office in
Melville's "Bartleby,' 21 the window does in fact look out onto a bare
brick wall.22)
I prefer to believe that the window can be created, but that
we lately have not chosen to make it. This preference is perhaps at
variance with that of the proverbial man-in-the-street, who says that
there ought to appear from somewhere a law; for, my preference
implicates me and you and him in a failure. Choice always carries
with it the possibility of failure. But this indictment of failed choice
brings with it community, for to be so "implicated" is for us to be
"entwined, closely joined" in the way that, for Nemerov, we are all
implicated by the confession of the "weak criminal," the poet. 23
The third thing that emerges for me from this male female
polarity is the problem of making the window into a door through
which we can more freely enter and leave the houses of the law, as
with a home to which we all have the latchkey. An imaginative
glimpse is one thing, a functioning way is something else. This is no
easy problem, even for those minded to perform the
re-engineering.24 Start with the window. Imagine a differently-based
legal system (or maybe not a system, if it comes to that) in which
relation rather than relevance is the point, in which caring rather
than rationality is the guide. Or maybe something else again. To
the extent that law is St. Paul to literature's twin city, Minneapolis,
(had you imagined it the other way around?) we might imagine this
more readily than we imagine. Those not minded to admit the
feminine in law might be reminded that "it is better to marry than

21

H. Melville, "Bartleby, the Scrivener A Story of Wall Street" in W. Berthoff, ed., Great
Short Works of Herman Melville (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1970) at 39.
22

See generally, B. Schwartz, "AMeditation on 'Bartleby" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L. J.

441.
23See Nemerov, supra, note 20 at 7.
24See, for example, F. Olsen, lThe Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal

Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L Rev. 1497. Professor Olsen sees clearly the harmful nature of the
dichotomy between male and female that we have created for ourselves and the attendant

projections that we employ using this dichotomy; and yet she is almost entirely bereft of
suggestions as to how we might, in her phrase, "transcend" the dichotomy.

168
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to burn," as even the great misogynist once said. 25 And I feel we
are badly aflame right now.
Consider a government of laws. No people, just laws. There
could of course be no hearings, for there would be no one with ears
to hear. There would only be process - due, it is certain, but
process only.
Habeas corpus becomes a Latin phrase for
impossibility, hearsay a double impossibility, voire dire something
done without eyes or mouth, a deed an unimaginable thing.
Contracts would draw together no ones. Property would be26proper
or improper but certainly not one's own or what one owes.
The impulse to this dystopia? Understandable, provided
there are people who can stand under the influence of the impulse.
We are fallible, we are fallen and so not as upright as we ought to
be; law, therefore, will be different. It will. And so ...
Sintax
The way literature tells it, you would think it should have
been easy - certainly by comparison with our modern-day complexity.
Listen:
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou
mayest freely eat:
But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, th 2 y shalt not eat of it: for in
the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.

A number of things strike me about this piece of legislation. There
is all the usual stuff: it is clear, fairly precise, pleasingly drafted, but
lacking, like so much of our own, a purposive section. Once upon

251 Cor. 7:9. For a literary defense of Paul that, in my opinion, does not succeed, see A.
Burgess, The Kingdom of the Wicked (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
26 Own" and "owe" were once the same word; this suggests the possibility of complex

relationship where we now can only see opposition.
27

Gen. 2:16-17.
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a time that was all the law and the prophets; 28 a true government
of law and not of men; and we still mucked it up. Notice that like

many modern legislators Jehovah failed to carry out his threat, at
least in quite the way it might have been fair to imagine Adam
interpreting it. Simple rule, but slippery in its enforcement. We all
know how the story goes from here: sorrow and obedience for the
woman, sorrow and work at the land for the man, curses all round
- what, with some minor changes, we might call life, rather than
death.

But what is most striking to me is that Eve was not yet in
existence when the original edict was passed. 29 I do not make a

case that she was ignorant of the law, because the transcript clearly
shows from her discussion with the serpent that she knew the law.3°
Her knowledge must have come from her man. I do remark on the

fact that She was not part of the society - one cannot really call it
that - in which the law was made. Perhaps it is simpler to say that
there was no society when the first law was made. And that is one
of the things that might have made it go wrong.
The word used for "sin" in the Bible implies a missing of the
mark, in the way that an arrow might miss the bullseyeY It is easy
to miss the mark in both legal and literary writing: sin in this
proper sense is one thing both cities have in common. And
concomitantly, a striving to get it right in language is a shared trait.
28

By contrast, I read today that the Law Reform Commission of Canada has released a
report which numbers the provisions of federal laws capable of being violated at 90,000: K.
Makin, "Most Laws Not Used, Report Says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (11 September
1986) 1. This says nothing of the laws made in the various Provinces. If I take the date (4004
B.C.) that appears at the top of the pages of Genesis in my Authorized King James Version
of the Bible (a figure arrived at by Bishop Usher in the 1600's, I believe), I calculate that
Canadian federal laws alone could have been created at the rate of fifteen a day since the dawn
of time and still not amount to our current total. (The rate would be even steeper if one were
to adopt the Jewish calendar, which dates creation at 3760 B.C.E)
29

Eve was not created until at least five verses later, Gen. 2:22, and after the work of
naming all the animals had been performed. She herself was not accorded a name until even
later. Gen. 3:20. There is some difficulty here, however, in the record, which might lead one
to believe that the report has been tampered with: In the verse in which she is named Chavah
(Eve, meaning "life" or "living") she is described as "the mother of all living." (emphasis mine)
30Gen. 3:3.
31In the Greek, the word is haniartiaand means to miss the mark; in Hebrew lachto (to
sin) and Iehachti (to miss) both derive from the root chet.
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The marvel for me is that there is a right we can imagine which we
do not possess, but which the getting of is important. Plato
marvelled at this too and I am afraid I am not sure he got it right.
(That itself is not an easy idea.) He objected that poetry and fiction
falsified the forms,3 2 a very peculiar notion for a writer, at least, for
whom falsification and fiction are different ideas.
There are times in writing literature and law when the
attempt does become one of "effing the ineffable," when an ideal is
felt to be present in the thoughts that the stubborn words will not
depict no matter how they are cast onto paper. More often,
however, my own concern for rightness does not manifest itself as
an unsatisfactory comparison between an imagined ideal and the
shape on the paper. It is rather a felt judgement that the words
simply are or are not right, and I will have at the time of creation
no extrinsic guide worthy of the name against which to measure
their rightness. They sound right or they do not, they look right or
they do not. They feel right or they do not. These are sensory
matters. And if I do project out of myself a touchstone, it is most
curious to me that it is the words themselves and their just-fashioned
neighbours that perform self-judgment as it were.
If my feel is a Platonic form, so be it. It does not seem so
to me. Nor, I think, does it seem so to writers at least of fiction
and to poets. Rather it seems to be a concern to render a concrete,
specific object or situation in all its warts and nubble: not ideal
nubble or nubble itself, but that very nubble over there that I see
or see in my imagination.3 3 Indeed for a writer of fiction or poetry
the fascination is with the unique, or as Hopkins put it, with:

32
Plato: The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974) Book II, 377;
see also Book X, 599b: "If he [the poet] truly had knowledge of the things he imitates, he
would much rather devote himself to actions than to the imitation of them."
33

Compare R. Demos, ed., Plato, Selections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927) at

XXV!

[Airt is unique among all the mental attitudes; unlike them, it brings the concrete
to the foreground, by regarding the universal as constituted in theparticular....To the
extent then that he denies the ultimate reality of the particular, Plato is consistent
in his attack on art. One may go so far as to say that art supplies the touchstone
by which Platonism may be judged.... (emphasis in the original).
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[A]II trades, their gear and tackle and trim.
All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckled...

Yet as the poem in full purports to argue, the very oddity of these
things may point to a universal that ties them together. Hopkins
would have it be God; I imagine it is I, my experience of all these
things. Either way it is a mystery which Nemerov puts in this
fashion:
[Hiow does the particular, in the course of being examined most particularly and for
itself alone, as a unique fact existing in the world, become meaningful, become
illustrative of general or eveniyniversal propositions? ... The exception turns out to
be, or proves to be, the rule.

This is reminiscent of the common law method. By a stern
and careful focus on the very facts of this very dispute a decision so
reached may prove to have created a rule. Justice in the instant
case makes instances from which justice emerges as a rule. Yes, yes,
there is the court of appeal breathing down the gown of the trial
judge, and yes there are precedents flashing distractingly like strobe
lights and which may not easily be blinked. That is why the poetic
concrete is only reminiscent of the common law method. But poets
have their critics and, too, their conventions which shape and tug.
My experience remains however of language sin, the missing
of the mark, as one of not making contact with my feeling, my
feeling when I am in contact with what I am writing about. Now,
to bring the notion of feeling35 into a discussion of law (which in
part this is) is a bit like setting a big, shiny, green frog on the
boardroom table while negotiating a business deal: it has a tendency
at least to stop the conversation in such settings. But I feel that it
is far more bizarre to carry on about law as if we did not have
feelings that touch on what we are doing. Marianne More said (and
is quoted in almost all high-school poetry texts as saying) that the

34See Nemerov, supra, note 20 at 45-46.
351 should clarify the way in which I am using the word feeling here. I mean primarily
that faculty of judgment which gives us a "feel" for a situation. This may, of course, manifest
itself in "feelings," that is, emotions; but it is not the emotionality itself with which I am mainly
concerned.
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poet should offer us "imaginary gardens with real toads in them." In
discussions of law that proceed without feeling, it is the law that is
"imaginary," and the frogs of feeling (I prefer frogs) that are "real."
I say that they are real, even though unacknowleged, because
they are more powerful for being unconscious than is the explicit
verbal production. Now frogs have always been bewitched critters,
as literature has told us36; they are human beings - and typically
men - under a spell, brought down (the evolutionary ladder); they
have no standing as human beings, but can only squat. Law's feeling
power is bewitched, held in a primitive, inferior state. When law
speaks without feeling it does not sing, as poets once did, it croaks,
an unpleasant sound with unpleasant effects.
Where there is witchery there must be a witch. Who has
done this thing to law? That is a complicated matter that cannot be
unravelled here. Suffice it to say that myth - literature - would tell

us that it is the revenge of the powerful female god, and in this case
probably Themis Chthonis,37 whose other self (and daughter) stands
atop our courts as Themis Justice, or Dike. Consider her: Woman
in the City of Convention is made of stone, as fixed as Lot's wife,
unneedful of the blindfold, for those drilled pupils will never truly
see. As a punishment for doing that to her, for scorning her earthy
side, she has bewitched us.
In the City of Invention woman is not statuary. She is Muse
- Erato, most likely - and half-sister cousin to Justice,38 and writers
actively woo her, welcome her, make of themselves living homes for
her if at all possible. 9

36See, M.-L. von Franz, The Psychological Meaning of Redemption Motifs in Fairy Tales
(Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980) at 58, 60-63, 67, 70-73, 78.
37The geneology of the Olympians is complicated even for a family law teacher. Thcmis
is a Titan, a daughter of Uranus and Gaea and a wife to Zeus. She has an aspect that is

designated with the epithet chthonis, which means "of the earth" (Gaea). (In English we have
the word "autochthon," which is used to describe people who have, seemingly, sprung from the
land itself, rather than arriving through migration.)
38

It is interesting that the Muses and not Justice have Memory for a mother. Stare decisis
is not so important to myth as it is to us now.
39See J. Fowles, Mantissa (Toronto: Collins, 1982) for a metafictional exploration of the
relationship between a writer and his muse.
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Relatively recently an entire volume of the Texas Law
Review was given over to a series of articles discussing law and
literature.4' I am fairly certain that not once in the symposium was
the word feeling used and discussed as representing something
important. Here was a seminal opportunity to marry (or engage in
courtship at least) two great children of writing, to profit by
exogamy, and what happened? The matter of interpretation was
beaten to a pulp, leaving some so unhappy that they despaired of
the possibility of meaning, despite - or perhaps in careful isolation
from - the fact that meaning is daily created by humble readers of
law and literature alike. It was as if they were runners paralyzed by
hearing Zeno explain that motion is impossible.
Without feeling, of course, there is no meaning. Those of
us who have trouble seeing that in law can see it when we read
literature. (Literary critics who despair may not be so lucky.) The
writer who has no Muse, no woman feeling, must "hire" one, with
the result that she is a whore and the writing will have all the
meaning of pornography, that is, the 'Writing of whores." Legal
scholars have tended not to court and to read and to learn literature
but rather to leap upon the corpus of criticism and to take from it
what they already have: reasoning bereft of useful feeling. This is
for me another way in which we can miss the mark in language.
Bread and Stone
It must have appeared to begin in this way, or something like
it: A leader goes off to brood, perhaps up into the mountains,
anywhere where his followers cannot get hold of him. He is gone
a longish time, enough to make people worry and perhaps plan his
replacement. The weather was probably bad while he was gone,
adding to their doubts about his survival. Then one day he
reappears, bringing something with him that he hadn't taken away.
It is what passes for a book, a slab more likely, and there are odd
marks all over it. This, he proclaims, is the law; I had it given to

40(1982) 60 Texas L. Rev. 373-586.
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me, I didn't make it up;41 I've brought it back for you. And now
you belong to the law.
If this isn't the origin of law in any useful, metaphorical way,
it is surely nevertheless the mythical junction of law and literature
in our history.
When as a young child I first heard the story of Moses and
Sinai, all I could think of was how heavy those tablets of stone must
have been. I am still today a sensualist. And my sense of law is
that we too often offer a stone where bread is wanted, peine forte
et dure instead of nourishment. (We have just seen how, for law,
the female is made of stone.) I certainly feel this way as a teacher
in class many times; and I would be willing to bet that the average
person's contact with the law leaves him or her abraded rather than
fulfilled. Yet stones can be special, and maybe we can make of our
hard cases something other than bad law.
Stones have magical properties as mythology will tell us.
Jacob "took of the stones of that place, and put them for his pillows,
and lay down in that place to sleep. And he dreamed."42 All of
alchemy was in search of the philosopher's stone, which had the
power of transmutation and perhaps immortality as well.43 Treatises
on precious stones, called lapidaries, were an important part of
medieval literature, and dealt with the curative properties of stones. 44
The use of stones as images of power and mystery in literature has
continued up to today. The novelist Robertson Davies, for instance,
placed a stone in the mouth of Boy Staunton's dead father, a stone
that the son, a lawyer, carried with him up to the moment of his
own transformation (also, as it happens, through dreams). 45
41

The subjective experience of the writer of fiction is often and ideally that he or she did
not make this up but rather that it came to them. when it isn't "coming," writing can be an
agony or simply impossible.
42

Gen. 28:11-12.

43See M.-L. von Franz, Alchemy, An Introduction to the Synibolism and the Psychology
(Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980).
44Seh, ed., Funk and WagnallsStandardDictionaryof Folklore,Mythology, and Legend (New
York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972) at 603.
45

R Davies, Fifth Business (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1970); The Manticore (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1972); World of Wonders (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975).
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Stones can symbolize the stubborn, specific enduring unique
nature of an entity. They can stand for the individual, as a
gravestone stands for the person who is dead. For law this suggests
that we might pay more attention to the unique individual. Yet, is
this not what we already do with our concept of the rights-bearing
monad, the "in-divid-ual" over and against society? And is this not
one of the sources of complaint against law, that it ignores or
subordinates community? Yes and no. To respect the individual, we
must know the individual; otherwise we merely respect her
individualness, her happening to be in a category of one, and this is
nothing at all. In much this latter way, protections for the
"individual" are wrested from Charter test cases by eager lawyers
without any concern whatever to know or understand the very
human being who has sought protection. Protections from the mass
are amassed in texts, and the human pretexts are written out of the
story.
To respect an individual, I repeat, we must know that
individual. Not his situation, not his case, not his facts - ideally, not
anything abstracted from him other than by another sensible, feeling
person. There must be a knower. In this relationship of knower
and known, one is no longer a monad bearing protective rights. In
this view rights emerge from the respect that each accords the other
because it is right to do so in their relationship. That is a matter
that takes one's all, intelligence, spirit, and feeling. In this sense,
the search for justice is the same as the search for le mot juste.
I do not (for more than one moment) believe that people
will simply turn to love each other. We are, after all, a nation that
markets Wonder Bread and Pet Rocks. I recognize that law has
been increasingly a language for strangers, for foreigners, and
concomitantly that those who come to law are made strangers
thereby. This is something that is not true, perhaps, to such a
degree of literature; it is not principally a language for strangers,
though, paradoxically, author and reader never meet. With law we
have lost sight of the unique tree for the forest:
Foris in plain Latin means outside. In the medieval dog-latin this has become
foranus, from which the French 'forain' and the English 'foreigner': in plain terms
an outsider. The original has varied little in the countries of the Mediterranean basin
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- forastero, forestiero. 'Frest' began as silva forestis, the wood outside. The Wild

Wood, dark and sinister.

It might be added that he who is sinister is left and thus not right.
Having gone to the Bible - the book - so many times for
images, I might be permitted to give you one of Northrop Frye's
categorizations of biblical imagery, and in particular that of this
section: bread and stone. In The Great Code47 he is concerned,
among other things, to classify images that recur in the biblical
canon; he creates a table of apocalyptic imagery and a table of
corresponding demonic imagery. Bread and stone, he tells us, are
apocalyptic images for the individual, in the vegetable and mineral
categories respectively. (As is the city, by the way, in the group
form.) But in the table of demonic counterparts, 48 the vegetative
becomes the Earth-Mother,49 and the mineral the Tower of Babel.
Eve, in her guise as Lilith5s at least, is to be a stranger, it seems,
with whom we babble in mutually incomprehensible tongues. How
might this change?
Pride Without Prejudice
I have managed, I think, to get this far without playing up
the mind body dichotomy more than the average writer of my age.
It is not easy to talk about bodies as I have done without conjuring
up this split and falling deeply into it. My vertigo at that prospect
is one of the reasons for my dancing around, I am sure. Mens

46

N. Freeling, A City Solitary (London: Heinemann, 1985) at 40.

47

N. Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (Toronto: Academic Press Canada,

1981).
48

Ibid. at 16 and supra, note 37 and the discussion there of Themis Chthonis.

49
Ibid. at 166-67.
50

1n Rabbinical writings, she is supposed to have been the first wife of Adam and made,
appropriately, out of the very mud of Earth. This Earth-Mother has been castigated for
thousands of years as the night monster. See, for example, the reference to her in Isa. 34:14
as the "screech owl."
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sana, corpus sanum, take your pick" has never appealed to me, even
as a bad joke for a camp motto.
But, you object, I have not once mentioned body as such.
I have instead talked a lot of myths and of the female. The great
and endangered body of the Earth on which we all live is, by every
account in Western mythology, female. Out of her body issues all
life, all creatures. Out of the bodies of women issues all human life,
all pro-creation. Such is the grip of this linkage on human minds
that body is woman, and to talk of the female is to talk of body.
Yet, since the beginning, humankind has known that Nature cares
nothing for civilization, which is the making of cities (civis = citizen
= denizen of city). It requires a marriage of intelligent human
qualities and the gifts of nature to create civilization, two of the
finest children of which are literature and law. Intelligence of the
sort required has mythically been seen as male, typically the spirit of
a sky god to complement, or cover, the earth goddess.
Somehow, intelligence of the male sort has grown ever more
overweening in its pride of place through the last few millenia.
Concomitantly, the generative forces of earth body have been
disparaged, condemned, damaged, and exiled to the night or to those
places where "there be dragons," from which places they continue to
bedevil and enchant us. This is especially clear to us now in our
current social struggle to answer the challenge and demands of what
we are pleased to call feminism. While literature has fallen prey to
this pride, it seems to me that it has not done so to anything like
the degree that law, its sister discipline of rhetoric, has fallen. Law
is too often, if not always, now the disembodied voice of rationality,
and we know what is written by intelligence without body: mene
mene tekel upharsin.51
Anything written out of a one-sided approach - whether law
or literature - is crippled. It is lop-sided, as a tree which has had
its own limbs lopped. We must recover the ability to feel the base,
the ground, upon which law stands and to permit ourselves to
51

Dan. 5:25-28. It is interesting that it was the Queen who brought Daniel (ie. the means of

interpretation)to the Kng. The meaning, if you are interested is as follows:
This is the interpretationof the thing: MENE; God hath numbered thy kingdom, and
finished iL (27) TEKEL: Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting.
(28) PERES: Thy kingdom is divided and given to the Medes and Persians.
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become invigorated with the nourishment that emerges from that
ground. We must temper reason. I shall give the last word on that
to Fay Weldon with whose love of Jane Austen I began:
A book that has no base in an initial reality, written out of reason and not conviction,
is a house built of - what shall we say? - bricks and no mortar? Walk iz 2 it, brush
against a door frame, and the whole edifice falls down about your ears.

52

Weldon, supra, note 1 at 17.

